When we first encounter the narrator of Austerlitz, he is wandering round the unfamiliar town of Antwerp with, he tells us, ‗unsicheren Schritten' (1; 9). As well as reflecting the unfamiliarity of the locale, these ‗uncertain steps' evince a proud modesty characteristic of the classic Sebaldian narrator, a wanderer who discreetly relays the stories of the people and places he is privileged to encounter. In this instance, the willingness to get lost pays off almost instantly, leading to his first meetinng with Austerlitz in the railwaystation waiting room, or ‗salle des pas perdus'. Uncertain or lost steps, it seems, are the way to go. Later, when Austerlitz finds himself counting in Czech, a language he was previously unaware he could speak, he too feels as if he is walking with ‗unsicheren Schritten ' (226; 234). But the uncertainty here belongs only to Austerlitz's waking consciousness, as he witnesses with astonishment the spontaneous reemergence of a capacity he had forgotten he ever had. Although Sebald does not use the phrase, steps of this sort, unpurposed yet unerring, are made with what is commonly known in German as somnambule Sicherheit: the legendary surefootedness of the sleepwalker.
3 familiar motifs of no particular provenance, and with no particular debts to settle. So, for Simon Ward, it is ‗not surprising' that Michael Hamburger's vision of the ruins of postwar Berlin in The Rings of Saturn is ‗hallucinatory', because it is experienced in ‗a kind of sleepwalk' (Ward 62) . Such a casual linkage of sleepwalking and extraordinary vision, however, belies a long and complex history. Of course, with the vogue for mesmerism in literary studies, it is now well-known that sleepwalking's association with clairvoyance dates to 1784 when the Comte de Puységur coins the term ‗somnambulisme provoqué' . But the vision of sleepwalkers had been a matter of debate long before this, and the sleepwalker's surefootedness is key to this history. From the early modern period, the question was: if the senses are shut, what keeps the sleepwalker safe? Thus, for Jacobus Horstius, it is surefootedness that exceeds nature and points to the hand of providential angels . Such popish superstition was countered by more materialist accounts-usually a mélange of Aristotle, Lucretius, and Galen-but even in these, the performance of the ‗imagination' set free by the extinction of the senses retains something of the marvellous Sauvages 307, Muratori 51) . Mesmerism inherits these debates, and never quite has done with them. And when mesmerism recedes from the cultural horizon, somnambule Sicherheit remains the aspect of sleepwalking that keeps one foot in the fantastic.
In an age of disenchantment and disappointed rationalism, however, this sense of the fantastic or providential proves highly equivocal. When Freud uses the phrase somnambule Sicherheit (or one of its common variants, schlafwandlerische or traumwandlerische Sicherheit) on a number of occasions in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, it describes the only-seemingly miraculous manner in which the unconscious leads us back to rediscover an object we hid in a blind rage (see e.g. SE 4 140; GW 155-56). But the phrase thus also holds open a door to a mystical reinvestment which, raised onto a political stage cleared of obstacles, may prove disastrous. Thus when Hitler, speaking in Munich in 1936, declares he moves ‗mit traumwandlerischer Sicherheit', we are to understand that his steps are directed and consecrated by the destiny of the Volk (Domarus 790; 606) . In a curious way, Hitler here represents himself as the mass man of late nineteenth and early twentieth-century social theory, only magnified and put at the head of the mass. The analogy may seem stretched: mass man, one would tend to think, is a figure of incapacity, not of surefootedness. In Gustave Le
Bon's crowd theory, sleepwalking models the unconsciousness and moral incapacity of the individual caught in a crowd. And according to José Ortega y Gasset's technocriticism, technology supplements mass man's capabilities in such a way as to supplant his rationality and agency entirely. Yet in either case, the sleepwalker is still surefooted after a fashion-that of the machine, the mass, or routine. Hitler has not added surefootedness to this picture, but he has reinstated the sense of providence that makes him a just instrument. This crucial detail apart, he never spoke a truer word.
It is important to note all this because the role of ideas of somnambulism in German art and culture of the period of the rise of National Socialism has tended to be swallowed up in the more familiar theme of hypnotism. Hypnotism's important and ambiguous role in German cinema of the 1920s and 1930s, notably in the films of the Fritz Lang, was pointed out long ago by Siegfried Kracauer. Its use as a fable for demagoguery is also familiar from novels such as Thomas Mann's Mario and the Magician (1930) . But ideas of unprovoked sleepwalking and trance also have a part to play: the protagonists of Mann's The Magic Mountain (1924) and Elias Canetti's Auto da Fé (1935) are drawn into alternative worlds, disastrously blind to unfolding political events, and struggle to establish any meaningful agency. The most sustained and 5 nuanced exploration of these themes in all their social and political implications is to be found in Hermann Broch's 1933 novel-trilogy The Sleepwalkers. All Broch's characters are more or less sleepwalkers, in the sense that their idea of the path they tread is pathetically incapable and misguided. But they are at their worst when most surefooted.
For this dubious capacity is owed to total complicity with a reified and false world. They may fall prey to, or even become, demagogues, but the efficient cause is their certainty.
It matters considerably, then, how Sebald positions certainty in relation to sleepwalking in Austerlitz. Austerlitz's attempts to recall his past-his Czech infancy and evacuation on the Kindertransport in the 1930s-are gradual and halting until, in the midst of a breakdown, he buries his papers-the fruits of a failed, obfuscatory mode of research-and takes to aimless night wandering round London (178; 186) . Thus it is semi-conscious, seemingly-undirected physical activity, rather than study and reflection, that leads him to a waiting-room in Liverpool Street station where, with the intensity of a vision, he is suddenly sure the Kindertransport disembarked (193; 201) . Similarly, when he arrives in Prague, his senses rather than his intellect carry him unerringly to his parents' old apartment (212; 220). Throughout the novel, Austerlitz makes his advances in this way, by retracing past steps on the ground, and giving his consciousness up to the path, engaging involuntary memory at a level beyond the defensive formations of consciousness.
As this last formulation hints, Sebald has often been read through variants of Freudian theory, in terms of trauma and anamnesis. The narrator's ‗unsicheren Schritten', however, are far less easily accommodated into this sort of theory.
Austerlitz's forgotten history is his own to rediscover, but the narrator has no part in this, and the uncanny coincidences which repeatedly bring the two together must be of another order. Moreover, Sebald scarcely plays down the element of the uncanny in 6 these encounters. They occur in what seems to the narrator an incomprehensible (unbegreifliche) manner (36; 44). And one encounter happens ‗strangely enough' (sonderbarerweise) just as Austerlitz is musing on his need for a listener (59-60; 67-68) . Doubtless a shared love of dingy train stations and other spots putatively imbued with the melancholy of disaster may go some way toward rationalising such coincidences, but what are we to do with the heightened rhetoric of destiny that accompanies them?
Austerlitz's theory of the traces of pain which striate history (16; 24) seems germane to this question. For while we are lost in admiration for the beauty and pathos of his exposition of this dolorous idea, might not a doubt intrude as to the potential for mystification in the idea of an affective mark which exceeds the limits of the individual psyche to take on a quasi-objective existence as a pathway along which sensitive travellers may be unconsciously drawn? Our doubts will only increase if we suspect Sebald's writing itself aspires to this condition of perfect tact emerging out of apparent uncertainty. It is not impossible to read this claim in the narrator's admiration for Austerlitz's sentences. Developing out of absentmindedness (Zerstreutheit), yet highly balanced (ausgewogensten), Sebald's famous, rolling sentences might also be said to advance step-by-step (schritteweise) towards ‗a kind of historical metaphysic, bringing remembered events back to life ' (14; 24) . Indeed, given that a large part of the novel consists of Austerlitz's proxy narration, how could it not share in his putative capacities?
Critical Certainties
If there is any justice in the doubt I am raising here, it poses awkward questions for a highly influential tendency in Sebald criticism. Sebald is often seen as exemplary in his capacity to force readers into ethical vigilance by generating insoluble uncertainties. In this way the lulling, seductive quality of his prose, the seeming certainty of generic 7 categories, and the claims to truth of memoir and photography, are read as so many lures leading us to an inevitable and salutary frustration. So, discussing the ambiguous nature of Vera's somnambulistic vision in Austerlitz, Carolin Duttlinger notes that the photograph which prompts it positively engages ‗imaginary, hallucinatory response' (Duttlinger 163) . The artifice is, however, foregrounded so as to reveal ‗the aporetical nature of the process of remembrance' (161). According to this line of argument, then, if Sebald's texts see clear, they nonetheless do not claim, in the mystical sense of clairvoyance or Hellsehen, to see through. Rather, what they show is precisely the opacity of phenomena, and the essentially fictive, mediated nature of historical recovery.
If we as readers are led to sleepwalk, then, it is only to be jolted out of the illusion.
Necessary and persuasive as this sort of argument is, one may still worry that it is sometimes a little too certain that Sebald does indeed generate this sort of uncertainty, and, paradoxically, that this leaves us in a good place (see e.g. Gregory-Guider). Other critics have taken issue with this. Peter Morgan, for instance, argues that Sebald's cultivation of generic uncertainty is more evasive than epistemologically demanding, and sees in his melancholia a universalising of disaster which postively invites over-easy and all-too-gratifying identifications. Julia Hell, responding to another essay by Todd Samuel Presner published in the same number of the journal Criticism, is rather less emphatically condemnatory, but in her discussion of Sebald's famous description of the Hamburg firestorm she questions the idea that it constitutes a ‗successful attempt to represent a modernist event' (Hell 370) . The requisite ‗estranging modernist traces' are visible, but only barely so (371). Hell's article also, however, asks us to think about another sort of uncertainty, one that most Sebald criticism seems reluctant to pursue.
For, she argues, the horror-stricken (entzetzensstarre) gaze which Sebald grafts onto the wide-open eyes (aufgerissenen Augen) of Walter Benjamin's ‗angel of history' conveys 8 his own predicament. Like the angel, Sebald is ‗mesmerized by death and destruction and seduced by a natural history of destruction' (375). The horror of his gaze is thus directed not just at ‗Germany's calamitous history' (376), but ‗at his own writing that comes so close, so dangerously close, to what it tries to keep at bay' (380).
Hell's point here is not simply to condemn Sebald for aestheticising disaster, but rather to acknowledge what she calls the ‗unpredictable hazards of representation'. This consideration takes us beyond any idea of uncertainty as the trustworthy outcome of a textual game led by our admired hero-author. For it suggests that literary material, in its exteriority, is not infinitely plastic. Self-evident as this last statement may seem, it is worth remembering at this point. Sebald has been the doubtful beneficiary of a critical reception, especially in the English-speaking world, that sometimes seems to want to see in him the bearer of an exorbitant writerly tact, an exceptional ability to pick his way through toxic elements of his cultural inheritance. Yet this very surefootedness is itself part of that cultural inheritance and, pushed too far, may itself prove toxic. Sleepwalking is thus not just any example of an equivocal topic in which Sebald becomes embroiled.
It has the potential to render ambiguous the readerly and textual consciousness upon which criticism bases its moral judgements of praise and condemnation alike, and may even counsel an ambivalence which will not allow us simply to divide the honours neatly between authors. I will return to this matter in my concluding comments. For the time being, suffice it to say that the benevolence with which Sebald's fictions are often viewed stands in stark contrast to the (characteristically) polemical treatment he metes out to Broch. to the irrationalism of the narrative, they also argue that rationality is itself fatally constrained by the logos of the age, and ontogenetically sedimented with irrationality (Rabaté 145) . Having thus cut the ground from under its feet, it is hardly surprising, and not necessarily a failing, that the novel struggles to come to a synthesis.
Sebald on Broch
Likewise, if the ‗loss of reality' in The Sleepwalkers is an aesthetic failing, it ought also to be admitted that it is fairly explicitly thematised as a symptom of the the point is that the ground upon which they set foot may no longer be quite what they think it is. Like sleepwalkers, they walk in a landscape of their dreams. Indeed, something very similar could be said of the solitary walkers of spectral, melancholic landscapes Sebald would come to write himself. How will we view Sebald's distaste for Broch's theorising if that very theorising turns out to be implicit in his own works?
Groundlessness and Reification
From the start of the first volume of his novel, Broch suggests that a terrifying loss of firmness befalls the very substance of the ground when its anchoring ideology comes asunder. Joachim von Pasenow, as the younger son, is ejected against his will from the family estate, into the city and a military career for which he is temperamentally unsuited. This personal and circumstantial exile, however, only serves to obscure a more radical loss of the land. It is 1888 and, with the accession of Wilhelm II, we are invited to see the beginning of the end of the German Empire.
ii The feudal Junkers have now to compete with rising industrialism, and though the loss of their estates and political influence is a long way off, the values once surely embedded in the land are already starting to work their way loose. Joachim feels this perhaps more than most of his class yet has no political understanding of the situation, experiencing only an amorphous and insidious ‗Unsicherheit'. Clinging to the chimera of the land's essential goodness, he must look for alien interference in the shape of his friend Bertrand, who is leaving the army to become an industrialist: ‗yes', Joachim reasons to himself, ‗if Bertrand had grown up on the land he would not be spreading insecurity' (Sleepwalkers 31-32; 36).
At times Joachim may even depend on what he sees as Bertrand's ‗Sicherheit', his
cosmopolitan sophistication, but this only makes him all the more uneasy (134; 150-51).
Blaming alien causes is doomed to failure, for the trouble infects the very heart of the aristocratic landscape of house and estate. Although Joachim says he longs for the country while he is in the city, it is precisely in the city, and in the form of longing, that the value of the land is most present to him. Wandering an unsuitable suburb, he is free to dream of this Heimat as an idealised parkland through which his intended, Elisabeth rather, what he apprehends is a chain of substitutions. But the apparent negativity of this displaced truth is belied, or at least tempered, by the certainty with which it is felt.
Broch may seem to go much further in the direction of crediting his characters with visionary insight; at any rate their visions are more ecstatic, hysterical,
eschatological. Yet, at the same time, the outcome of the these visions may be rather more negative, and less certain. The state granted to Esch is referred to with emphasis, substantivally, as ‗his sleepwalking', invoking a quasi-mesmeric notion that the benighted automaton may be compensated with clairvoyance (292-96; 328-33) . And as he finally approaches Bertrand's house on foot, he even seems to enjoy somnambule Sicherheit (297; 334), leading some critics to wonder if the whole journey is not in fact a dream . It seems to me, however, that Broch is not so much intent on the ontological status of the experience as on the sort of knowledge it affords. What is ultimately revealed to Esch is little more than the bare fact that he is a sleepwalker (339-40; 380). One can scarcely call such negative knowledge enlightenment, for it does not result in an awakening. Here, Broch follows the logic of his concept with remorseless fidelity: in a world in which sleepwalking is the normal condition of humanity, this is the form reflexivity must take, passive and involuted; a dim night-light of the soul counselling nothing but acceptance of a loss of certainty.
Indeed, if this process is even to begin, something must happen to break the stride of habit: Esch's everyday, we are told, will have to be thrown into uncertainty (ins Unsichere) in a way that makes it questionable whether or not one walks on one's feet Worst of all, the very mark of ‗purposeful intelligence-the exposition of an idea by means of a certain stylistic facility-now seemed to me nothing but an entirely arbitrary or deluded enterprise ' (174-75; 183-84) . If narrative Sicherheit is thus ostensively renounced, walking takes up the relay as his ‗nocturnal wanderings lead him to Liverpool Street station and the forgotten place of his first arrival in London. We make our most decisive steps, he reflects, through an indistinct inner movement (aus einer undeutlichen inneren Bewegung) of which we are barely conscious (189; 197) . His purposeful accumulation of knowledge, on the other hand, had only ever ‗served as a substitute or compensatory memory ' (198; 206) .
By abandoning the pseudo-tentacles of the reflecting intellect in favour of a more direct, physical groping, Austerlitz seems to echo Esch. Yet he is more fortunate than Broch seems to think so. When his characters experience anything like this degree of certainty, it is generally not a good thing. In the third volume, Huguenau's ‗schlafwandlerische Sicherheit' as he makes his way through the chaotic aftermath of the Great War is the mark of an amoral opportunism which culminates in the casual murder of Esch (348; 390). And his drift into business-like respectability in peace-time is no less damning: in either case he does nothing more than obey the logic of the times (637; 703). At this point we may look back to the remarkably extended meditation on
Joachim's father's gait with which the trilogy begins, and understand why the utter want of purpose behind his mechanically purposeful air is so horrifying (9-11; 11-13). Herr von Pasenow embodies the same sort of ‗objectivity' (Sachlichkeit) as Huguenau.
iii They are both mere formal men, passively and indifferently determined by the path of least resistance. They are not conscious of any unhappiness, but as their consciousness is entirely reified, they are perhaps not strictly conscious of anything at all.
System and Agency
While the moral reasons for rejecting Sicherheit are thus clear, the theoretical price of this rejection is high, and the consequences for practice are terrible, seemingly insoluble. will transform this physical knowledge into a rational one. The point, however, is not to take this step, but only to feel one could take it, so that Müller's final (non-) decision is to remain in a hovering condition (Schwebezustand), forever standing on the brink (574-75; 635).
It is, to say the least, a dubious position, one that explicitly refuses to reach a synthesis, and which certainly seems to chime with the ‗pure defeatism' which Sebald attributes to Broch (‗Una montagna' 125). By demoting consciousness to a modality of sleepwalking, one might argue, Broch has undermined the chances of agency from the word go, so constructing a system whose job it is precisely to make defeat seem inevitable. It is in this light that we must read Sebald's distaste for Broch's love of system and intellectualising grandiosity; for his ‗ethico-didactic sense of responsibility, in which he imagines he is allowed to leave nothing unsaid', and self-imposed need to tackle ‗big problems with large-scale concepts' (‗Una montagna' 120). Yet we will only concur in Sebald's view if we are convinced that Broch's initial premises, and so the dilemmas to which they lead, are entirely factitious. The problem for Sebald is that, as my analysis so far suggests, his own fiction seems to share many of these premises. 278; 286 and 304; 312) . And in the lectures on aerial bombing, it is explicitly theorised as a ‗quasi-natural reflex', a refusal through shame and defiance to accept the fact of destruction (Destruction 30-31; Luftkrieg 37-38). Prague has not been destroyed, but for its people it has undergone a change so radical it might as well have been. In their slowness and perplexity, the people register the fact that things are not right, but their awareness remains purely negative, locked in the physical act. Crucuially,
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Vera's narration itself seems to share in this condition: it cannot seem to rise above seeing things in their most obdurate, alienated, barely-grasped form, that of the obstacle.
So when she exclaims, we are now obliged to live in a false (or wrong) world (in einer falschen Welt), she is not casting a political judgement, but expressing shock at the sight of a car speeding towards her from the wrong direction. It is the change to driving on the right, she insists, that ‗particularly upset us ' (242-43; 250-51) . Such a response, able only to point in dismay at the brute fact, is shocking in its political incapacity. Even the plight of the Jews, as Vera goes on to narrate it, is viewed almost entirely in terms of restrictions of movement.
If Vera initially seemed to claim the narratorial privileges of distance and clearsightedness in presenting the pathetic spectacle of ‗the people', she is thus ultimately disappointed: she remains trapped in the same impotent consciousness as her fellow citizens. It seems she is not happy with this, for shortly afterwards she reworks the drama of the helpless sleepwalker in a rather more artful, visionary form. The ostensible occasion is one of two old photographs she has found by chance in a volume of Balzac which, she knows not how, came into her hand (der ihr, sie wisse gar nicht mehr wie, in die Hand geraten war). She has no recollection of taking the book, and the first thing she remembers is seeing herself reading it (256; 264). The discovery is, in other words, an act of somnambule Sicherheit, suggesting that what she subsequently ‗sees' is an act of clairvoyance.
The Swiss boy with the apple on his head appeared in my mind's eye, Vera continued; I sensed in me the moment of terror in which the narrow bridge gives way under the sleepwalker's foot, and imagined that, high in the rocks above, an the photograph has effectively been emptied out, ready to be replaced by a composite drama merging critical moments from the three pieces mentioned. The ‗vision' is thus patently factitious and mediated in any number of ways, and perhaps says as much about Vera's identity as a former student of Romance languages and literature as anything.
Yet it is not denied all affective truth: Austerlitz, at any rate, thinks he too can see (258; 265-66) . Indeed, it is precisely in this generalised form, and thanks to this elaborate theatrical framing, that Vera can feel pity for the plight of the sleepwalkers without falling into the picture. This is not an entirely reassuring reflection, for the vision is arguably guilty, in Sebald's terms, of ‗lyricising and mythologising' the plight of the people of Prague: if it works aesthetically, it is by turning away from the empirical detail of Vera's own experience of history into a literary substitute. Of course, Vera herself may also be read as reflecting pessimistically on her own aesthetic means.
As her notional walker steps from the theatre of Schiller (and Goethe, and Kleist), where sleepwalking certainty and clairvoyance are the prerogative of national heroes steadfastly pursuing self-determination, into the disenchanted world of Ibsen's When
We Dead Awaken, where the failure of vision and surefootedness leads the protagonists 25 into disaster, we may see an allegory of the demise of the transcendental aspect of Romantic topoi. Indeed, in stripping Amina of her somnambule Sicherheit (in Bellini's opera she makes it safely across the bridge), Vera may even be said to force the issue somewhat. But no matter how many such reflexive gestures we read, we must also admit that they are aesthetically productive. For they all point to loss-whether in the spectacle itself, or in the spectacle of Vera's spectatorship, or even in our own spectatorship-and any pathos accruing to that loss is our gain as spectators. What if all this painful consciousness of artifice ultimately resolves into an aesthetic of despondency, and one, what is more, that we have grown to desire?
As I have been suggesting, a dominant tendency in Sebald criticism resolves such questions by effectively deciding that Sebald's ‗steadfast gaze' really is ‗bent on reality' here (Destruction 51; Luftkrieg 57), with the proviso that the reality in question is not destruction itself, but the character's inability to face it. This critical move thus depends upon motives ascribed to characters to mediate, and distance us from, the aesthetic effects of the spectacle presented. The question I am now raising, however, is:
how often can a spectacle or motif recur before we are forced to abandon the appeal to the quasi-agency of characters, and see it as the property of the text itself? This question is surely starting to impinge as we come to the third and final staging of the scene, where
Austerlitz takes up the relay from Vera. Frustrated in his attempts to find his mother's face in a propaganda film showing Theresienstadt as a model labour camp, he has a slowed-down print made, hoping this will allow him a clearer view.
The men and women employed in the workshops now looked as if they were toiling in their sleep [im Schlaf], so long did it take them to draw a needle and thread through the air as they stitched, so heavily did their eyelids sink, so slowly did their lips move as they looked wearily up at the camera. They seemed to be 26 hovering rather than walking, as if their feet no longer quite touched the ground.
The contours of their bodies blurred and, particularly in the scenes shot out of doors in broad daylight, had dissolved at the edges... (345-48; 353) Ostensibly this is a failure, in the sense that Austerlitz's technological intervention brings him no closer to finding his mother. In this way we are once more invited to confront the mediated, phantasmal nature of the search. Viewed from another angle, however, Austerlitz's slow motion succeeds brilliantly in correcting the image, effectively restoring to these poor people the appearance the novel deems proper to those dragooned into a false course of history. Transported for incomprehensible reasons into a false landscape, they really ought not to feel their feet touch the ground. The heightened artificiality of the scene, following this reading, provides a sort of objective correlative, an adequate or just image, for the unreality of the experience for those in it.
Even the film's technical limitations-its blurring and flickering-which are presented as impediments to vision, become positive features of the spectacle, the natural complement of spectres throughout the novel. If we are being asked to question this spectacle, are we not also being tutored into desiring it?
Aesthetic Agency
At some point, all the framing and relativising of point of view in the world will start to family of somnambulists who, lost to the current of time, go through the same motions endlessly, may give rise to most beautiful and acute reflections on the sadness of history, but it is scarcely at the heart of the action . Likewise, the angel of history may be condemned to travel backwards, but when we speak of resistance we are usually expected to face forward. This is not to say that Sebald should offer an arm-raising call to action, but that his invocation of resistance strikes an odd note. For it comes dismayingly close to proposing something like the idea of ‗passive resistance' with which Broch and his ‗inner emigrant' contemporaries salved their consciences, and which was ‗indistinguishable from passive collaboration' (‗Una montagna' 121). Might we not begin to wonder if Sebald's own sleepwalkers may also be the vehicles of an aesthetic which offers a good conscience to political defeatism?
My purpose is not, however, to use Broch as a stick with which to beat Sebald.
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Both writers have, in their very different times, a profoundly ambivalent relationship with the inheritance of German Romanticism. Both see the dangers of mysticism and its atavistic survival into modernity; yet rather than simply sloughing off these aspects of Romanticism they find it necessary to tackle them head-on, and work them through.
They are hardly alone in this. Both are clearly influenced by psychoanalysis, and one of Austerlitz comes in the form of a goose in a circus. Joining the rest of the troupe in the finale, a strangely halting dance, it has the craned neck and lowered eyelids of a clairvoyant, and seems to know the fate of its companions. The fact that it is a goose is, of course, a fairly clear signal that we are not to take this magic too seriously. Yet we are expected to believe that in the image (Bild) of the goose is captured or sublated (aufgehoben) something-the mysterious evocative power of music-which Austerlitz has never been able to understand intellectually (383-84; 389-91) . In spite of the goose, the scene remains at some level an instance of the Romantic topos of seeing in the somnambulistic performance of a dancer or musician an intimation of something like destiny (see e.g. Heine 50).
Spectacular set-pieces of this sort are not, however, my ultimate concern. It is perhaps inevitable that they act as lightning-rods for critical attention in that they act out, in capsule form, problems with which the novel as a whole is concerned. But while they may influence how we weave the fabric of the narrative, they cannot simply legislate.
Indeed, given too much authority, they may serve to distract us from other forms of hazard, but that there is an inherent logic tending to flip from one extreme to the other.
And, again following the insistent lines of Adorno's argument, this will be so to the extent that a ‗consciousness of doom' is subject, like everything else, to commodification and reification. At a push we might even argue that the most extreme consciousness would be especially vulnerable: in its incessantly repeating anxiety it may take on the character of a fetish. Adorno's own passage from doom to fetish is of considerable interest here, for it resembles in some respects that of Sebald. In his very Curiously enough, Negative Dialectics even has its own fairy-tale goose, Mimi, from Wilhelm Hauff's tale ‗The Dwarf Nose'. Mimi, says Adorno, helps the boy who has been transformed into a dwarf to an understanding of his deformity that no amount of introspection could have supplied. In Adorno's reading, the tale is a fable of subjectivity: the subject is enchanted (verzaubert) by the name of subjectivity, just as Dwarf Nose is enchanted by the herb ‗sneezejoy'. Just as he must be directed by Mimi to the take the herb once more, so must we confront subjectivity homeopathically, so to speak, rather than by looking into our own subject as a given (182; 181). It is a charming fable, but the pharmakon-or, if you prefer, the hair of the dog that bit you-is always a risky quantity. Kill or cure, Adorno's rhetoric of enchantment inflates in direct proportion to the grinding intensity of his negative dialectic. Become compulsive, the language of disenchantment curiously rivals the sleep of reason in the production of monsters.
If one felt inclined to indict Adorno for backsliding one doubtless could. But where a predicament reveals itself so intractable in writers so differently situated, we may begin to suspect that it is a serious one, and it can hardly be the occasion for polemic and straightforward taking of sides. Neither Broch, nor Sebald, nor Adorno can remake from the ground up their intellectual inheritance; and there is no other ground on which they can stand, free of entanglement. This, indeed, is what Adorno's ‗Cultural Criticism' essay tells us. Each, therefore, must negotiate it after his fashion, but none can ever hope to dispose of it entirely. The task of criticism in such a case is thus not either to denounce or to excuse: it is to take stock of the risks in which our pleasure as readers entangles us. And this entails an order of uncertainty far more unsettling than that which may result from a textual game set up by a conscientious author. Is there not, in any case, something a little alarming in the idea of an author who would be so far the master of his proclivities, and who would move with such perfect tact, as to be able to lead us unscathed through doubt and destruction? And if our fervent attention to spectacular enactments of uncertainty only serves to screen more intractable problems, do we not risk sleepwalking through a simulacrum of critical consciousness?
We are all compelled to take a leap in the dark here, for the idea of a correct bad conscience is incoherent, ultimately indistinguishable from a commodified good conscience. As Sebald says of Broch, what distinguished him from the pedlars of fascism was his ‗good faith, coupled with a bad conscience as to the inner qualities of his writing' (‗Una montagna' 129). Faint praise as this may seem, ought not something of the sort to apply, to a greater or lesser extent, to any writer who takes seriously the difficulties of confronting political disaster? The practical question is, what form does one's conscience take, and where does one put it? There may be a sense in which
Sebald's criticism acts as a proxy conscience for his fiction, reassuring through its trenchant certainties that the suggestiveness and ambiguity of the fictions are in good faith. But if this is so, it seems the first casualty of polemic is ambivalence. For any appearance of moral rigor achieved in this way will be at the expense of evading, through a rather brutal division of labour, the synthesis that caused Broch so many pains.
Can such a cantonisation of the critical and the fictive, each in its proper place, ultimately work? One may suspect that the repressed part will, in either instance, have its revenge. In its anxiety to achieve moral clarity and distance, criticism may undo itself and end up acting out what it condemns. It is thus precisely through his sense of freedom from entanglement in any of Broch's dilemmas that Sebald ends up perversely evincing, in his criticism, the very pose of high-minded rationalism he claims to find so repellent in Broch's fiction, and even in terms avowedly borrowed from Broch. Likewise, the denunciation of a prophetic style may itself take on a dismayingly prophetic tenor.
Sebald perorates by imagining Broch close to death in exile in the United States, and contemplating a return to Judaism. Perhaps, Sebald suggests, Broch had at long last
